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Introduction	
	
We	have	colour	experiences.	When	you	look	at	the	patch	below	you	have	a	colour	experience	of	the	
patch	(I	will	assume	that	grey	is	a	colour).	You	also	have	a	shape	experience,	and	perhaps	other	kinds	
of	experience,	but	in	this	chapter	I	am	interested	mainly	in	colour	experiences.	
	
	
	
We	have	ways	of	describing	our	colour	experiences.	One	common	way	in	English	is	to	use	a	sentence	
whose	main	verb	is	‘look’.	For	example,	we	might	(correctly)	describe	your	colour	experience	of	the	
patch	above	by	using	the	following	‘look’	sentence:	
	
The	patch	looks	grey	to	you	
	
This	description	does	not	completely	specify	your	colour	experience,	because	‘grey’	is	too	general	a	
colour	term	–	we	would	have	to	use	a	more	specific	one,	such	as	‘dark	grey’,	or	something	even	more	
specific.	Nevertheless,	it	is	a	true	description.	
	
There	are	other	‘look’	sentences	that	we	might	use.	If	it	is	understood	that	we	are	talking	about	your	
visual	experience,	rather	than	someone	else’s,	then	we	might	drop	‘to	you’	and	simply	say:	
	
The	patch	looks	grey	
	
Care	needs	to	be	taken	here	–	we	might	use	this	same	sentence	to	talk	about	how	the	patch	looks	to	
people	 in	 general,	 not	 just	 to	 you	 on	 this	 occasion,	 so	 this	 use	 of	 the	 sentence	 might	 be	
misunderstood.	
	
We	might	use	a	variety	of	other	expressions	in	place	of	‘grey’:	
	
The	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	grey	things	do	
The	patch	looks	to	you	like	a	grey	thing	
The	patch	looks	to	you	as	if	it	is	grey	
The	patch	looks	to	you	to	be	grey	
	
If	 we	 want	 to	 be	 non-committal	 about	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 patch,	 perhaps	 to	 allow	 that	 you	 are	
hallucinating,	 then	 we	 might	 use	 one	 of	 the	 following	 sentences	 (although	 each	 involves	 saying	
something	slightly	different	from	above):		
	
It	looks	to	you	as	if	you	are	seeing	a	grey	patch	
There	looks	to	you	to	be	a	grey	patch	in	front	of	you	
	
I’ve	been	 interested	 for	a	while	 in	what	we	mean	by	 these	sentences.	More	generally,	 in	what	we	
mean	 by	 ‘look’	 sentences	 when	 we	 use	 them	 to	 describe	 our	 colour	 experiences.	 Even	 more	
generally,	in	what	we	mean	by	‘look’	sentences	when	we	use	them	to	describe	our	visual	experiences	
as	a	whole.	 I	call	 these	uses	visual	experience	uses	of	 ‘look’	sentences.	Not	all	of	our	uses	of	 ‘look’	
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sentences	 are	 visual	 experience	 uses.	When	 I	 say,	 ‘I	 looked	 out	 the	 window’,	 I	 am	 using	 a	 ‘look’	
sentence	but	it	is	not	a	visual	experience	use,	because	I	am	not	describing	a	visual	experience.	I	am	
interested	just	in	our	visual	experience	uses.		
	
My	aim	in	this	chapter	is	not	to	develop	a	theory	of	what	we	mean	by	our	visual	experience	uses	of	
‘look’	sentences	–	I	have	already	done	that,	 in	Breckenridge	(2018).	Rather,	my	aim	is	to	defend	an	
assumption	that	 that	 theory	makes	–	 that	 in	our	visual	experience	uses	of	 ‘look’	sentences	we	use	
‘look’	with	just	a	single	meaning.	I	will	also	argue	that	the	theory	gives	a	unified	account	of	all	of	our	
visual	experience	uses	of	‘look’	sentences	(which,	if	the	theory	is	right,	are	not	as	various	as	it	might	
initially	seem).	
	
I	will	start	by	briefly	illustrating	the	theory	that	I	develop	in	Breckenridge	(2018).	
	
What	we	mean	by	‘look’	sentences	
	
To	illustrate	the	theory	that	I	develop	in	Breckenridge	(2018)	I’ll	work	through	an	example	–	our	use	
of	 ‘The	patch	 looks	grey	to	you’	 to	describe	your	visual	experience	of	 the	patch	at	 the	start	of	 this	
chapter.	
	
We	 use	 each	 constituent	 of	 the	 sentence	 to	 express	 a	 property	 of	 events.	 We	 conjoin	 these	
properties	to	get	a	property	of	events	that	we	express	by	the	sentence	as	a	whole.	Then,	when	we	
assert	the	sentence	we	assert	that	there	is	an	event	that	has	this	property.	I’ll	work	through	this	step-
by-step.	
	
First,	by	the	verb	‘look’	we	mean	the	property	of	being	a	looking	event	(i.e.	an	event	in	which	things	
look	some	way	to	some	one)(	I	am	using	‘things’	non-referentially	here,	to	allow	that	there	might	be	
no	thing	that	looks	anyway,	as	might	be	the	case	during	a	hallucination).	We	use	‘look’	because	we	
are	talking	about	a	visual	experience;	had	we	been	talking	about	a	tactile	experience	then	we	might	
have	used	‘feel’	instead.	
	
Next,	to	the	verb	‘look’	we	add	the	present	tense	marker	‘-s’,	to	get	the	tensed	verb	‘looks’.	By	‘-s’	
we	mean	 the	property	of	 occurring	now.	What	we	mean	by	 ‘looks’	 is	 the	 conjunction	of	what	we	
mean	by	‘look’	and	what	we	mean	by	‘-s’;	that	is,	the	conjunction	of	the	property	of	being	a	looking	
event	and	the	property	of	occurring	now;	that	is,	the	property	of	being	a	looking	event	and	occurring	
now.	We	use	the	present	tense	marker	‘-s’	because	we	are	talking	about	an	event	that	is	occurring	in	
the	present;	had	we	been	talking	about	an	event	that	occurred	in	the	past	then	we	might	have	used	
the	past	tense	marker	‘-ed’	instead.	
	
Next,	to	the	tensed	verb	‘looks’	we	add	the	complement	‘grey’,	to	get	the	verb	phrase	‘looks	grey’.	
By	 ‘grey’	we	mean	 the	property	of	occurring	 in	a	certain	way.	 Looking	events,	 like	events	of	many	
other	kinds,	occur	in	various	ways.	What	is	it	for	a	looking	event	to	occur	in	a	certain	way?	The	kind	
looking	event	 is	a	determinable	kind	–	 it	has	determinates.	Each	of	 these	determinates	 is	a	way	of	
looking.	For	a	looking	event	to	occur	in	a	certain	way	is	for	it	to	be	of	one	of	these	determinate	kinds.	
Which	way	do	mean	by	‘grey’?	That’s	a	bit	complicated	–	I’ll	call	it	‘w’	for	now	and	come	back	to	this.	
By	‘looks	grey’	we	mean	the	conjunction	of	the	property	that	we	mean	by	‘looks’	and	the	property	
that	 we	 mean	 by	 ‘grey’.	 That	 is,	 the	 conjunction	 of	 the	 property	 of	 being	 a	 looking	 event	 and	
occurring	now	and	the	property	of	occurring	in	way	w.	That	is,	the	property	of	being	a	looking	event	
and	occurring	now	and	occurring	in	way	w.	We	use	‘grey’	because	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	it	
does;	 had	 it	 looked	 some	 other	 way	 then	 we	 might	 have	 used	 some	 other	 adjective	 (‘red’,	 for	
example).			
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Next,	to	the	verb	phrase	‘looks	grey’	we	add	the	modifier	‘to	you’,	to	get	the	verb	phrase	‘looks	grey	
to	 you’.	 By	 ‘to	 you’	 we	 mean	 the	 property	 of	 having	 you	 as	 an	 experiencer	 (someone	 who	 is	
experiencing	 the	 event).	 By	 ‘looks	 grey	 to	 you’	we	mean	 the	 conjunction	 of	 the	 property	 that	we	
mean	 by	 ‘looks	 grey’	 and	 the	 property	 that	 we	mean	 by	 ‘to	 you’.	 That	 is,	 the	 conjunction	 of	 the	
property	 of	 being	 a	 looking	 event	 and	occurring	 now	and	occurring	 in	way	w	 and	 the	property	 of	
having	you	as	an	experiencer.	That	is,	the	property	of	being	a	looking	event	and	occurring	now	and	
occurring	in	way	w	and	having	you	as	an	experiencer.	We	use	‘to	you’	because	we	are	talking	about	
your	 visual	experience	of	 the	patch;	had	we	been	 talking	about	mine,	 for	example,	 then	we	might	
have	used	‘to	Wylie’	instead.	
	
Next,	to	the	verb	phrase	‘looks	grey	to	you’	we	add	‘The	patch’,	to	get	the	sentence	‘The	patch	looks	
grey	to	you’.	By	‘The	patch’	we	mean	the	property	of	having	the	patch	as	a	stimulus	(something	that	
is	stimulating	the	event).	By	‘The	patch	looks	grey	to	you’	we	mean	the	conjunction	of	the	property	
that	we	mean	 by	 ‘looks	 grey	 to	 you’	 and	 the	 property	 that	we	mean	 by	 ‘The	 patch’.	 That	 is,	 the	
property	of	being	a	 looking	event	and	occurring	now	and	occurring	 in	way	w	and	having	you	as	an	
experiencer	 and	 the	 property	 of	 having	 the	 patch	 as	 a	 stimulus.	 That	 is,	 the	 property	 of	 being	 a	
looking	 event	 and	 occurring	 now	 and	 occurring	 in	 way	 w	 and	 having	 you	 as	 an	 experiencer	 and	
having	 the	 patch	 as	 a	 stimulus.	 We	 use	 ‘The	 patch’	 because	 we	 are	 talking	 about	 your	 visual	
experience	of	the	patch;	had	we	been	talking	about	your	visual	experience	of,	say,	a	cloud,	then	we	
might	have	used	‘The	cloud’	instead.		
	
Finally,	what	we	mean	by	 the	 sentence	when	we	assert	 it	 is	 that	 there	 is	 an	event	which	has	 this	
property.	So	we	mean:	
	
There	is	an	event	e	such	that	e	is	a	looking	event	and	is	occurring	now	and	is	occurring	in	way	w	
and	has	you	as	an	experiencer	and	has	the	patch	as	a	stimulus		
	
So	which	way	do	we	mean	by	‘grey’.	In	short,	it	is:	the	way	that	grey	things	look.	That	is,	the	way	w	
such	that	grey	things	look	w.	Here	I	intend	‘grey	things	look	w’	to	be	understood	generically.	So,	we	
might	 refer	 to	 it	 as:	 the	 way	 w	 such	 that	 it	 is	 generically	 true	 that	 grey	 things	 look	 w.	 Or,	 less	
ambiguously,	as:	the	way	w	such	that	it	is	generically	true	that	looking	events	whose	stimulus	is	grey	
occur	 in	way	w.	Actually,	there	are	many	such	ways,	varying	 in	their	degree	of	generality.	By	 ‘grey’	
we	mean	the	most	specific	one	of	these.	So,	by	‘grey’	we	mean:	
	
The	maximally	specific	way	w	such	that	it	is	generically	true	that	looking	events	whose	stimulus	is	
grey	occur	in	way	w	
	
So,	adding	this	to	the	above,	what	we	mean	by	‘The	patch	looks	grey	to	you’	is:	
	
There	 is	 an	event	 e	 such	 that	 e	 is	 a	 looking	event	 and	 is	 occurring	now	and	 is	 occurring	 in	 the	
maximally	specific	way	w	such	that	it	is	generically	true	that	looking	events	whose	stimulus	is	grey	
occur	in	way	w	and	has	you	as	an	experiencer	and	has	the	patch	as	a	stimulus		
	
Our	use	of	‘grey’	in	‘The	patch	looks	grey	to	you’	to	mean	a	way	of	looking	is	an	application	of	a	more	
general	 mechanism	 that	 we	 have	 for	 using	 adjectives	 to	 mean	 ways	 of	 occurring.	 We	 might	 use	
‘proud’	in	‘John	walks	proud’,	for	example,	to	mean	a	certain	way	of	walking	(the	maximally	specific	
way	w	such	 that	 it	 is	 generically	 true	 that	walking	events	by	proud	people	occur	 in	way	w),	or	we	
might	use	‘American’	in	‘Brad	talks	American’	to	mean	a	certain	way	of	talking	(the	maximally	specific	
way	w	such	that	it	is	generically	true	that	talking	events	by	American	people	occur	in	way	w),	etc.	
	
It	 is	 convenient	 to	 say	 that	by	 ‘grey’	 in	 ‘The	patch	 looks	 grey	 to	 you’	we	mean:	 the	way	 that	 grey	
things	look.	But	care	needs	to	be	taken	here.	One	might	wonder,	given	that	grey	things	look	all	sorts	
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of	ways	 in	different	conditions,	whether	there	 is	such	a	thing	as	the	way	that	grey	things	 look.	But	
‘the	way	grey	 things	 look’	 is	 shorthand	 for	 ‘the	maximally	 specific	way	w	such	 that	 it	 is	generically	
true	 that	 looking	events	whose	stimulus	 is	grey	occur	 in	way	w’,	and	 if	 this	 is	properly	understood	
then	it	is	quite	plausible	that	there	is	such	a	way.	First,	whether	it	is	generically	true	that	grey	things	
look	w	does	not	depend	on	how	grey	things	actually	look.	Compare	turtles:	there	is	a	generic	reading	
of	 ‘turtles	are	 long-lived’	on	which	 it	 is	 true,	even	though	the	vast	majority	of	 turtles	die	 just	after	
birth.	I	intend	‘grey	things	look	w’	to	be	understood	generically	in	the	same	kind	of	way.	Second,	the	
way	of	looking	w	such	that	it	is	generically	true	that	grey	things	look	w	might	be	a	fairly	general	way	
–	it	need	not	be	a	very	specific.	This	is	another	reason	to	think	that	there	might	be	such	a	thing	as	the	
way	that	grey	things	 look,	even	 if	 there	 is	some	variation	 in	the	way	that	grey	things	actually	 look.	
Compare	dogs:	there	is	such	a	thing	as	the	way	that	dogs	swim,	even	though	individual	dogs	swim	in	
all	kinds	of	ways.	This	way	is	not	a	very	specific	way	–	it	some	more	general	way.	So	too	with	the	way	
that	grey	things	look.		
	
Do	we	mean	anything	else	by	‘look’?	
	
I	have	just	briefly	 illustrated	the	theory	that	 I	develop	in	Breckenridge	(2018),	of	what	we	mean	by	
our	visual	experience	uses	of	‘look’	sentences.	According	to	this	theory	we	mean	the	same	thing	by	
‘look’	in	every	case	–	the	property	of	being	a	looking	event.	But	is	this	right?	It	has	been	said	that	we	
have	various	uses	of	‘look’,	even	when	it	comes	to	describing	visual	experiences.	It	is	not	always	clear	
whether	the	claim	is	that	we	mean	different	things	by	‘look’	itself	or	by	‘look’	sentences	as	a	whole.	I	
will	consider	both	possibilities.	 In	this	section	 I	consider	the	first	possibility.	 I	will	 look	for	evidence	
that	we	mean	different	things	by	‘look’,	and	argue	that	there	is	no	such	evidence.	In	the	next	section	
I	will	consider	the	second	possibility.	I	will	look	at	a	variety	of	things	that	we	are	purported	to	mean	
by	‘look’	sentences,	and	argue	that	they	give	us	no	good	reason	to	think	that	we	mean	anything	by	
our	 visual	 experience	 uses	 of	 ‘look’	 sentences	 that	 is	 not	 accounted	 for	 by	 the	 theory	 that	 I	 have	
developed.	
	
Various	categories	of	complements	
	
In	our	visual	experience	uses	of	 ‘look’	 sentences	we	use,	as	 the	complement	of	 ‘look’,	expressions	
from	 a	 variety	 of	 syntactic	 categories.	 Here	 are	 some	 that	 we	might	 use	 to	 describe	 your	 colour	
experience	of	the	patch	at	the	start	of	this	chapter:	
	
The	patch	looks	grey	
The	patch	looks	a	grey	thing	
The	patch	looks	of	a	grey	colour	
The	patch	looks	like	a	grey	thing	
The	patch	looks	greyer	than	the	page	
The	patch	looks	how	grey	things	look	
The	patch	looks	as	if	it	is	grey	
The	patch	looks	to	be	grey	
	
Among	 the	 complements	 here	 are	 an	 adjective	 phrase	 (‘grey’),	 a	 noun	 phrase	 (‘a	 grey	 thing’),	 a	
preposition	 phrase	 (‘of	 a	 grey	 colour’),	 a	 comparative	 phrase	 (‘like	 a	 grey	 thing’,	 ‘greyer	 than	 the	
page’),	a	relative	clause	headed	by	‘how’	(‘how	grey	things	look’),	a	phrase	headed	by	‘as	if’	(‘as	if	it	is	
grey’),	and	a	‘to’-infinitive	(‘to	be	grey’).	
	
More	carefully,	 I	should	say	that	surface	form	suggests	that	we	use	complements	from	a	variety	of	
syntactic	 categories.	 It	 could	 be,	 instead,	 that	 the	 complements	 include	 one	 or	more	 constituents	
that	are	not	visible	on	the	surface,	disguising	the	fact	that	they	are	actually	all	of	the	same	syntactic	
category.	If	that’s	so	then	the	reason	that	I	am	about	to	consider,	and	reject,	doesn’t	even	get	started.	
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But	even	if	we	do	use	expressions	from	a	variety	of	syntactic	categories	this	does	not	show	that	we	
use	‘look’	with	more	than	one	meaning	in	these	uses.	For	consider	the	‘live’-sentences	below:	
	
I	live	here	
I	live	in	Wagga	Wagga	
I	live	near	Canberra	
I	live	where	my	parents	live	
I	live	closer	to	Sydney	than	Melbourne	
	
In	 these	 sentences	 we	 use	 complements	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 syntactic	 categories	 –	 a	 noun	 phrase	
(‘here’),	 a	 preposition	 phrase	 (‘in	 Wagga	 Wagga’,	 ‘near	 Canberra’),	 a	 relative	 clause	 headed	 by	
‘where’	(‘where	My	parents	live’),	and	a	comparative	phrase	(‘closer	to	Sydney	than	Melbourne’)	(in	
these	examples	I	am	using	‘live’	in	the	sense	of	‘reside’,	rather	than	‘be	alive’).	But	in	these	sentences	
we	does	not	use	‘live’	with	a	variety	of	meanings	–	we	use	it	with	a	single	meaning	(I	take	this	to	be	
clear).	So	the	fact	that	we	use	a	verb	with	complements	from	a	variety	of	syntactic	categories	does	
not	show	that	we	use	the	verb	with	more	than	one	meaning.	(What’s	going	on	in	the	case	of	‘live’,	I	
suggest,	 is	that	we	have	various	ways	of	specifying	a	 location,	more	or	 less	specifically.	 I	would	say	
the	same	of	the	‘look’	case	too.)	
	
Paraphrasing	
	
The	verb	‘pick’	is	ambiguous.	What	we	(generally)	mean	by	it	in	the	first	example	below	is	different	
from	what	we	(generally)	mean	by	it	in	the	second:	
	
John	picked	some	strawberries	for	dinner	
John	picked	the	door	on	the	left	
	
One	way	to	see	that	what	we	mean	is	different	in	each	case	is	to	come	up	with	a	paraphrase	of	each	
and	compare	them.	In	the	first	example	(but	not	the	second)	we	mean	something	like	‘pluck’	–	it	is	
true	of	events	which	can	(near	enough)	be	described	as	‘plucking’	events;	in	the	second	example	(but	
not	 the	 first)	we	mean	 something	 like	 ‘choose’	 –	 it	 is	 true	 of	 events	which	 can	 (near	 enough)	 be	
described	as	‘choosing’	events.	Since	plucking	is	not	choosing,	what	we	mean	by	‘pick’	in	each	case	is	
different.	Call	this	evidence	from	paraphrasing	that	‘pick’	is	ambiguous.	
	
Is	 there	 any	 evidence	 from	paraphrasing	 that	 ‘look’	 is	 ambiguous?	 There	 is,	when	we	 consider	all	
uses	of	‘look’	sentences	(not	restricting	to	visual	experience	uses).	Consider	the	following:	
	
John	looked	embarrassed	
John	looked	at	his	mum	
	
In	 the	 first	 example	 above	 (but	 not	 the	 second),	 ‘look’	 means	 something	 like	 ‘visually	 appear’,	
whereas	in	the	second	example	(but	not	the	first)	it	means	something	like	‘visually	observe’,	or	‘gaze’.	
	
But	there	is	not,	as	far	as	I	can	tell,	any	evidence	from	paraphrasing	when	we	confine	our	attention	
to	 visual	 experience	 uses	 of	 ‘look’	 sentences.	 I	 cannot	 see	 any	 way	 to	 show,	 by	 coming	 up	 with	
different	paraphrases,	that	we	mean	different	things	by	‘look’	when	we	use	them	to	describe	visual	
experiences.	Consider	the	following	sample:	
	
The	patch	looks	grey	
He	looks	a	character	
Those	women	look	in	love	
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She	looks	like	a	duck	
The	top	line	looks	longer	than	the	bottom	line	
John’s	mum	looks	how	she	always	looks	
It	looks	as	if	these	tomatoes	are	ripe	
They	look	to	be	tired	
	
When	trying	to	paraphrase	 ‘look’	 in	each	case	 I	keep	coming	up	with	more	or	 less	 the	same	thing,	
something	like	‘visually	appears’.	
	
It	 is	 important	 that	 the	 task	 in	 each	 case	 is	 to	 paraphrase	 just	 the	 word	 ‘look’,	 not	 the	 whole	
sentence.	We	would	expect	there	to	be	differences	between	the	meanings	of	these	sentences	as	a	
whole,	 differences	 that	we	might	 be	 able	 to	 bring	 out	 by	 paraphrasing	 the	 sentences.	 But	we	 are	
looking	for	differences	 in	the	meaning	of	the	word	‘look’	 in	these	sentences,	and	evidence	for	that	
must	come	from	paraphrasing	just	the	word	‘look’.	
	
Non-contradiction	
	
Coming	 up	 with	 evidence	 from	 paraphrasing	 that	 a	 word	 is	 ambiguous	 might	 require	 us	 to	 be	
explicitly	aware	of	any	ambiguity,	so	perhaps	the	reason	why	there	is	no	evidence	from	paraphrasing	
that	‘look’	is	ambiguous	in	visual	experiences	uses	of	‘look’	sentences	is	not	that	it’s	not	ambiguous,	
but	 that	we	are	not	explicitly	 aware	of	 the	ambiguity.	 The	next	 kind	of	 evidence	does	not	 require	
explicit	awareness,	just	implicit	awareness.	
	
Another	way	to	see	that	‘pick’	is	ambiguous	is	to	see	that	there	is	a	reading	of	the	sentence	below	on	
which	 it	 expresses	 a	 non-contradictory	 proposition,	 a	 reading	 that	 is	 made	 more	 salient	 by	
emphasising	the	second	occurrence	of	‘pick’.	
	
John	picked	the	door	on	the	left,	but	he	didn’t	pick	the	door	on	the	left	
	
Call	this	evidence	from	non-contradiction	that	‘pick’	is	ambiguous.	
	
It	 is	 important	 that	 the	 reading	 in	 question	 is	 made	 more	 salient	 by	 emphasising	 the	 second	
occurrence	 of	 ‘pick’,	 rather	 than	 by	 emphasising	 some	 other	 expression	 in	 the	 sentence.	 If	 there	
were	 a	 non-contradictory	 reading	 of	 the	 sentence	 that	 is	 made	more	 salient	 by	 emphasising	 the	
second	occurrence	 of	 ‘door’	 instead,	 then	 that	might	 be	 evidence	 that	 ‘door’	 is	 ambiguous,	 but	 it	
would	not	be	evidence	that	‘pick’	is	ambiguous:	
	
John	picked	the	door	on	the	left,	but	he	didn’t	pick	the	door	on	the	left	
	
Is	there	evidence	from	non-contradiction	that	‘look’	is	ambiguous?	There	is,	when	we	consider	‘look’	
in	all	of	its	uses.	Consider	the	sentence	below:	
	
John	looked	over	the	moon,	but	he	didn’t	look	over	the	moon	
	
There	 is	 a	 reading	 of	 this	 sentence,	 one	 that	 is	 made	 more	 salient	 by	 emphasising	 the	 second	
occurrence	of	‘look’,	on	which	it	expresses	a	non-contradictory	proposition	(a	proposition	that	is	true	
if	John	visually	appeared	over	the	moon	but	did	not	direct	his	gaze	over	the	moon).	
	
But	there	 is	no	evidence,	as	far	as	 I	can	tell,	when	we	just	consider	visual	experience	uses	of	 ‘look’	
sentences.	None	of	the	sentences	below	has	a	non-contradictory	reading	that	is	made	more	salient	
by	emphasising	the	second	occurrence	of	 ‘look’,	and	as	far	as	 I	know	the	same	is	true	for	all	visual	
experience	uses	of	‘look’	sentences.	
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The	patch	looks	grey,	but	it	doesn’t	look	grey	
He	looks	a	character,	but	he	doesn’t	look	to	be	a	character	
Those	women	look	in	love,	but	they	don’t	look	to	be	in	love	
She	looks	like	a	duck,	but	she	doesn’t	look	like	a	duck	
The	top	line	looks	longer	than	the	bottom	line,	but	it	doesn’t	look	longer	than	the	bottom	line	
John’s	mum	looks	how	she	always	looks,	but	she	doesn’t	look	how	she	always	looks	
It	looks	as	if	these	tomatoes	are	ripe,	but	it	doesn’t	look	as	if	these	tomatoes	are	ripe	
They	look	to	be	tired,	but	they	don’t	look	to	be	tired	
	
Conjunction	reduction	
	
Because	‘pick’	is	ambiguous	we	have	the	following	phenomenon.	Suppose	that	John	wants	to	give	a	
flower	 to	his	 girlfriend;	he	doesn’t	 know	much	about	 flowers,	 so	his	mum	chooses	an	appropriate	
one	in	the	garden,	which	he	then	plucks;	but	he	does	know	a	lot	about	timing,	so	he	chooses	the	best	
moment	 to	give	 the	 flower.	There	 is	a	 reading	of	 the	 first	 sentence	below	on	which	 it	expresses	a	
proposition	 that	 is	 true	 in	 these	 circumstances.	 But	 any	 such	 reading	 of	 the	 conjunction-reduced	
second	 sentence	 requires	 understanding	 ‘pick’	 in	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	weird	way,	 sometimes	 called	 a	
zeugmatic	reading	of	‘pick’	(see	Quine	(1960,	p.	130)).	
	
John	picked	a	rose	and	John	picked	the	ideal	time	to	give	it	
John	picked	a	rose	and	the	ideal	time	to	give	it	
	
Call	this	evidence	from	conjunction	reduction	that	‘pick’	is	ambiguous.	
	
We	 get	 the	 same	 phenomenon	 for	 ‘look’	 when	 considered	 in	 all	 of	 its	 uses.	 If	 John	 appeared	
embarrassed	while	gazing	out	 the	window,	 then	there	 is	a	 true	 interpretation	of	 the	 first	sentence	
below,	but	any	true	interpretation	of	the	second	requires	a	zeugmatic	reading	of	‘look’.	
	
John	looked	out	the	window	and	John	looked	embarrassed		
John	looked	out	the	window	and	embarrassed	
	
But	we	do	not	get	this	phenomenon	for	‘look’	in	our	visual	experience	uses	of	‘look’	sentences.	For	
any	circumstances	in	which	there	is	a	true	interpretation	of	the	first	sentences	below,	there	is	a	true	
interpretation	of	the	second	sentence	that	does	not	require	a	zeugmatic	reading	of	‘look’.	
	
The	patch	looks	grey	and	the	patch	looks	a	square	thing	
The	patch	looks	grey	and	a	square	thing	
	
John	looks	like	a	philosopher	and	John	looks	as	if	he	thinks	like	one	too	
John	looks	like	a	philosopher	and	as	if	he	thinks	like	one	too	
	
The	sky	looks	how	it	usually	looks	but	the	sky	looks	slightly	less	cloudy	
The	sky	looks	how	it	usually	looks	but	slightly	less	cloudy	
	
Bill	looks	smarter	than	Ben	but	Bill	looks	to	be	less	wise	
Bill	looks	smarter	than	Ben	but	to	be	less	wise	
	
There	 may	 be	 pragmatic	 reasons	 why	 it	 is	 odd	 to	 use	 instances	 of	 some	 of	 these	 –	 it	 may,	 for	
example,	be	misleading	to	use	‘and’	rather	than	‘but’.	But	to	be	misleading	in	that	kind	of	way	is	not	
to	be	zeugmatic.	
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Question	formation		
	
Because	‘pick’	 is	ambiguous	there	are	contexts	in	which	the	conversation	below	would	be	perfectly	
felicitous	(note	the	emphasis	on	‘pick’	when	A	repeats	her	question):	
	
A:	What	did	John	pick?	
B:	He	picked	a	rose.	
A:	No,	that’s	not	what	I	meant.	What	did	John	pick?	
	
If	 ‘look’	 is	ambiguous	then	there	should	be	similarly	felicitous	conversations.	And	indeed	there	are,	
when	we	 consider	 ‘look’	 in	all	 of	 its	 uses	 –	 there	 are	 contexts	 in	which	 the	 conversation	below	 is	
felicitous	(take	a	context	in	which	John	looked	through	binoculars	at	the	couple	next	door	and	what	
he	saw	made	him	look	embarrassed).		
	
A:	How	did	John	look?	
B:	He	looked	through	binoculars.	
A:	No,	that’s	not	what	I	meant.	How	did	John	look?	
	
If	we	use	‘look’	with	more	than	one	meaning	in	our	visual	experience	uses	of	‘look’	sentences	then	
there	 should	 be	 similarly	 felicitous	 conversations.	 But	 as	 far	 as	 I	 can	 tell	 there	 are	 no	 such	
conversations.	There	is	no	context	in	which	the	conversation	below,	for	example,	is	felicitous.	
	
A:	How	does	the	patch	look?	
B:	The	patch	looks	as	if	it	is	grey.	
A:	No,	that’s	not	what	I	meant.	How	does	the	patch	look?	
	
The	 emphasis	 is	 important.	 The	 are	 felicitous	 conversations	with	 different	 emphasis.	 For	 example,	
consider	a	context	in	which	there	are	two	patches.	Then:	
	
A:	How	does	the	patch	look?	
B:	The	patch	looks	as	if	it	is	grey.	
A:	No,	that’s	not	what	I	meant.	How	does	the	patch	look?	
	
A	stronger	conclusion?	
	
I	 have	 argued	 that	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 from	 syntactic	 variety,	 from	 paraphrasing,	 from	 non-
contradiction,	from	conjunction	reduction,	or	from	question	formation	that	we	use	‘look’	with	more	
than	one	meaning	in	our	visual	experience	uses	of	‘look’	sentences.	Perhaps	this	can	be	made	into	an	
argument	 for	 a	 stronger	 conclusion,	 that	we	don’t	 use	 ‘look’	with	more	 than	 one	meaning	 in	 our	
visual	experience	uses	of	 ‘look’	sentences.	The	argument	goes	as	 follows:	 if	we	did	 then	we	would	
have	evidence	of	at	least	one	of	these	kinds;	we	don’t	have	evidence	of	any	of	these	kinds;	therefore,	
we	don’t.	I’m	not	sure	whether	the	first	premise	of	this	argument	is	true.	
	
Do	we	mean	anything	else	by	‘look’	sentences?	
	
In	the	previous	section	I	argued	that	we	have	no	good	reason	to	think	that	we	mean	different	things	
by	‘look’	in	our	visual	experience	uses	of	‘look’	sentences.	What	about	the	sentences	themselves?	Do	
we	mean	anything	by	 them	that	 is	not	accounted	 for	by	 the	 theory	 that	 I	develop	 in	Breckenridge	
(2018)?	
	
I	will	 consider	a	 fairly	exhaustive	 list	of	purported	uses	of	 ‘look’	 sentences,	and	argue	 in	each	case	
that	either	(a)	we	have	no	such	use,	or	(b)	if	we	do	have	such	a	use	then	it	is	not	a	visual	experience	
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use,	 or	 (c)	 if	 we	 do	 have	 such	 a	 use	 then	 it	 is	 already	 accounted	 for	 by	 the	 theory	 that	 I	 have	
developed.	If	this	is	right	then	we	have	no	good	reason	to	think	that	we	mean	anything	by	our	visual	
experience	uses	of	‘look’	sentences	that	is	not	accounted	for	by	the	theory	that	I	have	developed.	
	
I	start	by	considering	five	purported	uses	that	I	think	are	of	the	second	kind	–	if	we	do	have	such	uses	
then	they	are	not	visual	experience	uses.	
	
Tentative	assertion	use	
	
It	has	been	claimed	(e.g.	by	Price	(1932,	1941,	1964),	Quinton	(1955,	1973),	and	Ayer	(1940,	1956))	
that	we	 sometimes	 use	 ‘look’	 sentences	 to	make	 tentative	 assertions.	 For	 example,	we	might	 use	
‘The	patch	looks	grey’	to	tentatively	assert	that	the	patch	is	grey.	If	we	use	‘The	patch	looks	grey’	to	
tentatively	 assert	 that	 the	 patch	 is	 grey	 then	 we	 use	 it	 to	 assert	 that	 the	 patch	 is	 grey,	 because	
tentative	assertion	is	assertion,	in	which	case	we	must	mean	by	the	sentence	that	the	patch	is	grey.	
So	the	view	can	be	put	as	follows:	
	
There	is	a	use	of	‘O	looks	F’	on	which	we	mean	that	O	is	F		
	
Non-visual	use	
	
Price	(1932,	1941,	1964),	Jackson	(1977,	pp.	30-1),	and	Leeds	(1975,	p.	199)	have	all	claimed	that	we	
have	a	non-visual	use	of	‘look’	sentences.	They	would	say	something	like	this:	
	
There	is	a	use	of	‘It	looks	(to	S)	as	if	P’	on	which	we	mean	that	there	is	evidence	(not	necessarily	
visual)	(for	S)	that	P	
	
Inclination-to-believe	use	
	
Price	(1932,	1941,	1964),	Chisholm	(1957,	1965,	1966),	and	Travis	(2004)	all	make	something	like	the	
following	claim:	
	
There	is	a	use	of	‘O	looks	F	to	S’	on	which	we	mean	that	S	is	inclined	to	believe,	on	the	basis	of	
her	visual	experience	of	O,	that	O	is	F	
	
Chisholm	 calls	 this	 the	 ‘epistemic’	 use	 of	 ‘look’	 sentences;	 I	 shall	 follow	 Price	 in	 calling	 it	 the	
inclination-to-believe	use.	
	
What-would-be-judged	use	
	
Vesey	(1956,	1971a,	1971b)	and	Dretske	(1995)	each	make	what	amounts	to	the	following	claim:	
	
There	is	a	use	of	‘O	looks	F	to	S’	on	which	we	mean	that	if	S	were	to	judge,	on	the	basis	of	how	O	
looks	to	her,	and	with	no	reason	to	think	otherwise,	she	would	judge	that	O	is	F	
	
Vesey	calls	this	the	‘epistemic’	use	of	‘look’;	Dretske	calls	it	the	‘doxastic’	use.	I	will	call	it	the	what-
would-be-judged	use.	
	
Visual	evidence	use	
	
Jackson	(1977)	makes	something	like	the	following	claim:	
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There	is	a	use	of	‘It	looks	(to	S)	as	if	P’	on	which	we	mean	that	there	is	visually	acquired	evidence	
(for	S)	that	P	
	
He	calls	 this	 the	 ‘epistemic’	use,	but	 to	avoid	confusion	with	how	others	have	used	the	 ‘epistemic’	
label	I	shall	call	this	the	visual	evidence	use.	
	
I	hope	that	it’s	clear	enough	that	if	there	are	these	uses	then	none	of	them	is	a	visual	experience	use,	
because	 none	 of	 them	 is	 a	 use	 on	 which	 we	 describe	 visual	 experience.	We	might	 be	 describing	
something	 that	 is	 somehow	 connected	 with	 a	 visual	 experience,	 but	 we	 are	 not	 describing	 visual	
experience	itself.	
	
Comparative	use	
	
Various	people	(for	example	Chisholm	(1957,	pp.	45-6),	Vesey	(1956,	1971a,	1971b),	Jackson	(1977,	
pp.	 31-3),	 Travis	 (2004),	 Leeds	 (1975,	 p.	 200),	 Dretske	 (1995,	 pp.	 67-9)	 and	 Pettit	 (2003))	 have	
claimed	something	like	the	following:	
	
There	is	a	use	of	‘O	looks	F	(to	S)’	on	which	we	mean	that	O	looks	(to	S)	the	way	F	things	look	
	
Vesey	calls	this	the	‘resemblance’	use	of	‘look’	sentences;	I	will	follow	Chisholm	and	Jackson	in	calling	
it	the	comparative	use.	
	
None	would	 agree	 that	 ‘the	way	 F	 things	 look’	 is	 the	 right	definite	description	 to	use	here	–	 each	
would	use	a	more	qualified	one.	Chisholm	would	use	‘the	way	F	things	ordinarily	look’,	or	‘the	way	F	
things	might	ordinarily	be	expected	to	look’.	Jackson	would	use	‘the	way	an	F	thing	normally	looks	in	
C	to	S’,	for	certain	conditions	C	and	observers	S	determined	by	the	context	of	utterance.	Leeds	would	
prefer	 ‘the	 way	 F	 things	 usually	 look	 in	 daylight’,	 or	 ‘the	 way	 F	 things	 usually	 look	 in	 standard	
conditions’.	Dretske	would	add	reference	to	an	observer,	and	also	his	 ‘discriminatory	clause’:	by	‘O	
looks	F	to	S’	we	mean	that	O	looks	to	S	the	way	F	things	normally	look	to	S,	and	O	looks	different	to	S	
from	 certain	 other	 non-F	 things.	 Despite	 these	 differences,	 they	 all	 agree	 that	 once	 the	 definite	
description	is	suitably	qualified,	perhaps	in	a	way	that	allows	the	meaning	of	‘O	looks	F	(to	S)’	to	vary	
across	contexts	of	utterance,	the	claim	above	is	true.	
	
I	agree	that	we	do	have	such	a	use,	and	that	it	is	a	visual	experience	use.	But	it	is	already	accounted	
for	by	the	theory	that	I	develop	in	Breckenridge	(2018).	I	would	formulate	the	claim	as	follows:	
	
There	is	a	use	of	‘O	looks	F	(to	S)’	on	which	we	mean	that	O	looks	(to	S)	the	maximally	specific	
way	w	such	that	it	is	generically	true	that	F	things	look	w	
	
Phenomenal	use	
	
Price	(1932,	1941,	1964),	Quinton	(1955,	1973),	Vesey	(1956,	1971a,	1971b),	Chisholm	(1957,	1965,	
1966),	and	Jackson	(1977)	all	claim	that	we	sometimes	use	‘look’	sentences	to	directly	describe	our	
visual	experiences.	I	think	we	can	understand	the	claim	to	be	this:	
	
There	 is	 a	use	of	 ‘O	 looks	 F	 to	 S’	on	which	we	mean	 that	 S’s	 visual	 experience	of	O,	or	 some	
feature	of	the	experience,	is	F	
	
Price	 calls	 this	 the	 ‘basic’	 use,	 Vesey	 calls	 it	 the	 ‘optical’	 use,	 and	 Chisholm	 calls	 it	 the	 ‘non-
comparative’	use.	I	will	follow	Jackson	in	calling	it	the	phenomenal	use.	
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I	 take	 it	 that	 if	we	do	have	such	a	use	 then	 it	 is	with	a	 restricted	class	of	 complements	of	 ‘look’	–	
colour	 adjectives	 such	 as	 ‘grey’,	 and	 perhaps	 also	 shape	 adjectives	 such	 as	 ‘square’.	 It	 would	 be	
implausible	 to	extend	 it	 to	adjectives	 such	as	 ‘heavy’	–	 it	 is	 implausible	 that	 there	 is	 a	use	of	 ‘The	
patch	 looks	 heavy	 to	 you’	 on	 which	 we	mean	 that	 your	 visual	 experience	 of	 the	 patch,	 or	 some	
feature	of	it,	is	heavy,	since	visual	experiences	and	their	features	are	not	the	kinds	of	things	that	can	
be	heavy.	Jackson	explicitly	acknowledges	this	restriction:	“The	phenomenal	use	is	characterized	by	
being	explicitly	tied	to	terms	for	colour,	shape	and/or	distance…	That	is,	instead	of	terms	like	‘cow’,	
‘house’,	‘happy’,	we	have,	in	the	phenomenal	use,	terms	like	‘red’,	‘square’,	and	‘longer	than’”	(1977,	
p.	33).	
	
If	we	do	have	such	a	use	of	‘look’	sentences	then	it	is	clearly	a	visual	experience	use.	But	I	don’t	see	
any	reason	to	think	that	we	have	such	a	use.	 I	will	consider	and	reject	 the	reasons	that	have	been	
given	for	thinking	that	we	do.	Quinton	and	Vesey	simply	claim	without	argument	that	we	have	such	a	
use.	Chisholm,	Price	and	Jackson	each	give	arguments	–	I	will	consider	their	arguments	in	turn.	
	
Chisholm	
	
Chisholm	(1965,	pp.	50-3)	discusses	 ‘appear’	rather	than	‘look’.	 I	 take	 it	that	he	would	be	happy	to	
say	 the	 same	 thinks	 about	 ‘look’,	 so	 I’ll	 modify	 his	 discussion	 to	 ‘look’,	 to	 match	 the	 rest	 of	 this	
chapter.	
	
Chisholm	argues	that	we	have	a	phenomenal	use	(he	calls	it	the	‘noncomparative’	use)	by	appealing	
to	something	like	the	sentence	below:	
	
Things	which	are	grey	usually	look	grey	in	daylight	
	
He	claims	that	this	sentence	is	ambiguous,	between	a	reading	on	which	it	is	‘analytic’	and	a	reading	
on	which	it	is	‘synthetic’.	On	its	analytic	reading	it	can	be	paraphrased	using	the	first	sentence	below,	
and	on	its	synthetic	reading	it	can	be	paraphrased	using	the	second.	
		
Things	 which	 are	 grey	 usually	 look	 in	 daylight	 the	 way	 things	 which	 are	 grey	 usually	 look	 in	
daylight	
There	is	a	certain	way	of	looking,	looking	grey,	such	that	things	which	are	grey	happen	to	usually	
appear	that	way	in	daylight	
	
The	 reason	 why	 it	 has	 these	 two	 readings,	 Chisholm	 seems	 to	 think,	 is	 that	 ‘look’	 itself	 has	 two	
readings	–	 it	can	be	read	 in	the	comparative	sense,	but	also	 in	a	distinct	phenomenal	sense.	When	
‘look’	is	read	in	its	comparative	sense,	to	look	grey	in	daylight	is	to	look	the	way	things	which	are	grey	
usually	 look	 in	 daylight,	 and	 this	 accounts	 for	 the	 analytic	 reading.	 When	 ‘look’	 is	 read	 in	 its	
phenomenal	sense,	however,	 ‘looks	grey’	 is	an	unanalysable	predicate,	and	 it	 is	this	sense	of	 ‘look’	
that	accounts	for	the	synthetic	reading.	
	
Leeds	 (1975)	argues,	against	Chisholm,	 that	 if	 there	 is	 such	an	ambiguity	 there	 is	no	need	 to	 think	
that	it	is	due	to	an	ambiguity	in	‘look’.	I	think	that	Leeds	is	right.	Here	I	will	present	my	own	version	
of	what	is	essentially	Leeds’	argument.		
	
Leeds	 suggests,	 and	 I	 agree	 with	 him,	 that	 talk	 about	 the	 sentence	 being	 ambiguous	 between	
analytic	 and	 synthetic	 readings	 is	unclear,	 and	 that	 the	ambiguity	Chisholm	 is	pointing	 to	 is	better	
brought	out	by	embedding	the	sentence	in	a	modal	context.	Thus,	rather	than	the	original	sentence	
being	ambiguous	between	analytic	and	synthetic	readings,	 let’s	take	the	fact	to	be	explained	to	be	
that	the	sentence	below	is	ambiguous	between	true	and	false	readings.	
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Necessarily:	things	which	are	grey	usually	look	grey	in	daylight	
	
Chisholm’s	claim	then	translates	as	this:	 this	sentence	 is	ambiguous,	between	a	true	reading	and	a	
false	 reading,	 and	 this	 is	 because	 ‘look’	 is	 ambiguous,	 between	 a	 comparative	 sense	 and	 a	
phenomenal	sense.	
	
The	 problem	 for	 Chisholm	 is	 that	 if	 there	 is	 a	 comparative	 reading	 of	 ‘look’	which	 is	 as	 Chisholm	
claims	 it	 is,	 then	 it	 alone	 can	 account	 for	 the	 true	 and	 false	 readings	 of	 this	 sentence.	 On	 the	
comparative	reading	of	‘look’,	it	can	be	paraphrased	as	follows:	
	
Necessarily:	things	which	are	grey	usually	look	in	daylight	the	way	things	which	are	grey	usually	
look	in	daylight	
	
This	 sentence	 is	 structurally	 ambiguous,	 between	 a	 reading	 on	which	 the	 definite	 description	 ‘the	
way	things	which	are	grey	usually	 look	in	daylight’	 is	within	the	scope	of	the	operator	‘necessarily’,	
and	a	reading	on	which	the	operator	‘necessarily’	is	within	the	scope	of	the	definite	description	‘the	
way	things	which	are	grey	usually	look	in	daylight’.	We	can	represent	the	two	readings	as	follows:	
	
Necessarily:	the	way	w	such	that	grey	things	usually	look	w	in	daylight	is	such	that:	grey	things	
usually	look	w	in	daylight	
The	way	w	such	that	grey	things	usually	look	w	in	daylight	is	such	that:	necessarily:	grey	things	
usually	look	w	in	daylight	
	
The	first	is	true	but	the	second	is	false	(it	might	have	been	that	grey	things	usually	look	w'	in	daylight,	
where	w'	is	not	the	way	grey	things	actually	look	in	daylight).	So	the	ambiguity	here	can	be	explained	
as	a	structural	ambiguity	in	the	sentence,	rather	than	as	a	lexical	ambiguity	in	the	verb	‘look’.	There	is,	
then,	 despite	 what	 Chisholm	 thinks,	 no	 good	 reason	 here	 to	 think	 that	 we	 have	 a	 use	 of	 ‘look’	
sentences	that	is	distinct	from	the	comparative	use.	
	
Price	
	
Here	is	an	argument	in	the	style	of	ones	given	by	Price	(1964,	pp.	15-16):	
	
If	the	patch	looks	grey	in	the	comparative	sense,	then	the	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things	look.	
Why	 does	 the	 patch	 look	 the	way	 grey	 things	 look?	 Because	 the	 patch	 looks	 grey.	 This	 is	 an	
informative	answer.	Since	it	is	an	informative	answer,	we	cannot	be	using	‘the	patch	looks	grey’	
comparatively,	because	then	it	would	amount	to	saying	that	the	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things	
look	because	the	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things	look,	and	that	is	not	informative.	Thus,	there	is	
a	use	of	‘The	patch	looks	grey’	which	is	not	the	comparative	use.	
	
If	this	argument	is	sound	it	does	not	show	that	the	extra	use	is	the	phenomenal	use,	but	it	does	at	
least	show	that	there	is	an	extra	use	of	‘The	patch	looks	grey’,	in	addition	to	the	comparative	use.	
	
Nevertheless,	 I	 do	 not	 think	 that	 the	 argument	 is	 sound,	 because	 it	 has	 a	 false	 premise.	 The	
argument	goes	as	follows.	Consider	the	following	two	sentences:	
	
The	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things	look,	because	the	patch	looks	grey	
The	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things	look,	because	the	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things	look	
	
There	 is	a	reading	of	the	first	sentence	above	on	which	 it	 is	 informative;	but	there	 is	no	reading	of	
the	 second	 sentence	on	which	 it	 is	 informative;	 so	 there	 is	 a	 reading	of	 ‘The	patch	 looks	 grey’	 on	
which	it	does	not	mean	‘The	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things	look’,	for	otherwise	there	would	be	no	
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such	difference	between	the	two	sentences;	so	there	is	a	use	of	‘The	patch	looks	grey’	distinct	from	
the	comparative	use.	
	
But	the	second	sentence	does	have	a	reading	on	which	it	is	informative	–	at	least	one	that	is	just	as	
informative	as	any	reading	of	the	first.	Consider	the	analogous	sentence	below:	
	
John	loves	the	prettiest	girl	in	class,	because	John	loves	the	prettiest	girl	in	class	
	
This	has	a	reading	on	which	it	is	not	informative.	But	it	also	has	a	reading	on	which	it	is	informative.	
The	informative	reading	can	be	given	as	follows:	
	
John	loves	the	prettiest	girl	in	class,	because	John	loves	x,	and	x	is	the	prettiest	girl	in	class	
	
In	 the	 same	way,	 the	 second	 sentence	 above	 has	 a	 reading	 on	which	 it	 is	 informative,	 a	 reading	
which	can	be	given	as	follows:	
		
The	 patch	 looks	 the	way	 grey	 things	 look,	 because	 the	 patch	 looks	w,	 and	w	 is	 the	way	 grey	
things	look	
	
This	reading	is	at	least	as	informative	as	any	reading	of	the	first	sentence	on	which	it	is	informative.	
For	the	first	to	be	informative	we	need	to	understand	it	as	meaning	something	like	‘The	patch	looks	
the	way	grey	things	look,	because	the	patch	looks	grey	(and	that’s	the	way	grey	things	look)’.	This	is	
no	more	informative	than	the	informative	reading	of	the	second	sentence.		
	
Jackson	
	
Jackson	(1977,	ch.	2)	argues	that	we	have	a	use	of	‘look’	sentences	which	is	neither	the	comparative	
use	nor	the	inclination-to-believe	use	(which	he	calls	the	‘epistemic’	use).	His	argument	is	this:	
	
We	have	a	use		of	‘look’	sentences	on	which	what	we	mean	by	‘The	patch	looks	grey’	cannot	be	
given	by	reference	to	the	way	grey	things	look	to	certain	observers	in	certain	conditions,	nor	by	
reference	to	beliefs;	 if	 this	were	the	comparative	use	then	what	we	mean	by	 ‘The	patch	 looks	
grey’	 could	 be	 given	 by	 reference	 to	 the	way	 grey	 things	 look	 to	 certain	 observers	 in	 certain	
conditions,	so	 it	 is	not	the	comparative	use;	 if	 it	were	the	 inclination-to-believe	use	then	what	
we	 mean	 by	 ‘The	 patch	 looks	 grey’	 could	 be	 given	 by	 reference	 to	 beliefs,	 so	 it	 is	 not	 the	
inclination-to-believe	use;	 thus,	 it	 is	neither	the	comparative	use	nor	the	 inclination-to-believe	
use.	
	
He	takes	this	additional	use	to	be	the	phenomenal	use.	
	
I	agree	with	Jackson	that	we	have	a	use	of	 ‘look’	sentences	on	which	what	we	mean	by	‘The	patch	
looks	grey’	cannot	be	given	by	reference	to	the	way	grey	things	look	to	certain	observers	in	certain	
conditions,	 nor	 by	 reference	 to	 beliefs.	 But	 I	 disagree	 with	 Jackson	 that	 this	 use	 is	 not	 the	
comparative	use,	because,	unlike	Jackson,	 I	think	that	what	we	mean	by	the	comparative	use	need	
not	(in	fact,	should	not)	be	given	by	reference	to	certain	observers	in	certain	conditions.	
	
Jackson	takes	it	that	the	comparative	use	of	‘look’	sentences	is	such	that	there	is	some	expression,	S,	
which	 refers	 to	 or	 quantifies	 over	 certain	 people,	 and	 some	 expression,	 C,	 which	 refers	 to	 or	
quantifies	over	certain	conditions,	such	that	the	following	is	true:		
	
By	‘The	patch	looks	grey	to	you’	we	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	grey	things	look	to	
S	in	C	
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I	believe,	contrary	to	this,	that	by	‘The	patch	looks	grey	to	you’	we	just	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	
you	 the	 way	 grey	 things	 look,	 where	 ‘the	 way	 grey	 things	 look’	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 generically.	
Jackson’s	 arguments	 do	 not	 work	 against	 this	 account	 of	 the	 comparative	 use.	 I	 will	 consider	
Jackson’s	 argument	 that	 what	 we	 mean	 by	 ‘The	 patch	 looks	 grey	 to	 you’	 cannot	 be	 given	 by	
reference	to	the	way	grey	things	 look	to	certain	observers	 in	certain	conditions,	and	briefly	explain	
how	 it	 does	 not	 show	 that	what	we	mean	 cannot	 be	 given	 in	 terms	 of	 the	way	 grey	 things	 look,	
understood	generically.	
	
Jackson	argues	that	there	are	no	expressions	S	and	C	which	make	the	sentence	above	true	but	non-
trivial.	
	
He	starts	by	considering	the	following	account:	
	
By	‘The	patch	looks	grey	to	you’	we	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	grey	things	look	to	
you	in	normal	circumstances	
	
He	points	out	that	this	cannot	be	right.	Suppose	that	you	see	 in	shades	of	 red,	but	with	extremely	
good	 red	 vision	 –	 you	 can	make	 amongst	 reds	 the	 same	number	 of	 discriminations	 that	 a	 normal	
sighted	person	can	make	amongst	colours	in	general.	Then	it	might	be	true	that	the	patch	looks	the	
way	grey	things	look	to	you	in	normal	circumstances,	but	false	that	the	patch	looks	grey	to	you.	
	
He	next	considers	an	account	that	refers	to	people	other	than	you:	
	
By	‘The	patch	looks	grey	to	you’	we	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	grey	things	look	to	
most	people	in	normal	circumstances	
	
He	points	out	that	how	things	look	to	you	does	not	depend	on	the	existence	of	other	people	–	things	
might	look	grey	to	you,	even	if	no	one	else	did,	does,	or	will	exist.	So	it	will	not	do	to	make	reference	
to	other	people.	
	
He	also	points	out	that	there	is	a	problem	explaining	what	‘normal	circumstances’	are	in	a	way	that	
does	 not	 make	 these	 accounts	 trivial.	What	 are	 normal	 circumstances?	 Perhaps	 circumstances	 in	
daylight:	
	
By	‘The	patch	looks	grey	to	you’	we	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	grey	things	look	to	
you	in	daylight	
	
But	your	eyes	might	be	dazzled	in	daylight	in	such	a	way	that	grey	things	do	not	look	grey	to	you	in	
daylight,	but	they	do	look	grey	to	you	under	low	intensity	light	instead.	
	
He	 next	 considers	 explaining	 ‘normal	 circumstances’	 as	 being	 circumstances	 which	 best	 facilitate	
colour	discrimination.	But,	he	points	out,	these	are	circumstances	that	exaggerate	colour	differences,	
so	they	are	circumstances	 in	which	things	 look	more	different	 in	colour	 than	they	really	are,	so	do	
not	look	the	colour	they	are.	
	
The	only	way	of	correctly	specifying	what	normal	conditions	are,	he	concludes,	makes	these	accounts	
trivial:	normal	circumstances	are	those	in	which	grey	things	look	grey	to	you.	But	by	‘The	patch	looks	
grey	to	you’	we	do	not	mean	something	trivial.	
	
Jackson	 then	 argues	 that	 there	 is	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 the	 account	 cannot	 be	 right,	 for	 any	 actual	
observers	or	 actual	 circumstances.	 There	might	be	a	 shade	of	 colour,	 call	 it	 c,	 such	 that	 the	patch	
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looks	c	to	you	even	though	no	object	actually	is	c.	Then	it	would	be	true	that	the	patch	looks	c	to	you	
but	 not	 true	 that	 the	 patch	 looks	 the	 way	 c	 things	 look	 to	 you	 (or	 anyone	 else)	 in	 normal	
circumstances	(or	any	other	circumstances)	–	since	there	are	no	c	things	there	is	no	such	way.	This	
will	 be	 case	 for	 any	 value	 of	 S	 that	 is	 an	 actual	 observer	 and	 for	 any	 value	 of	 C	 that	 is	 an	 actual	
condition.	
	
Jackson	considers	a	counterfactual	fix:	
	
By	‘The	patch	looks	grey	to	you’	we	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	grey	things	would	
look	to	you	in	normal	circumstances	if	there	were	any	
	
He	argues	(successfully,	I	think)	that	this	cannot	be	right	either.	
	
Jackson	concludes	that	by	‘The	patch	looks	grey	to	you’	we	do	not	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you	
the	way	grey	things	look	to	S	in	C,	for	any	values	of	S	and	C.	
	
I	agree	–	we	will	not	be	able	to	find	appropriate	values	for	S	and	C.	But	I	think	that	we	don’t	need	to	
in	order	 to	state	what	we	mean	by	the	comparative	use.	According	to	the	theory	that	 I	develop	 in	
Breckenridge	(2018),	by	‘The	patch	looks	grey	to	you’	we	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	w	
such	that	grey	things	look	w.	Here,	‘grey	things	look	w’	is	to	be	understood	generically;	it	expresses	a	
relation	between	the	property	of	being	an	event	in	which	a	grey	thing	looks	some	way	to	someone,	
and	the	property	of	being	an	event	that	occurs	in	way	w.	A	generic	like	this	can	be	true	even	if	there	
are	no	actual	events	in	which	a	grey	thing	looks	some	way	to	someone.	In	particular,	 it	can	be	true	
even	if	there	are	no	actual	grey	things.	
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